In my column last month, I introduced the concept of the “Iron Triangle.” This model in construction management consists of the elements of scope, budget and schedule. The main thrust of my own perspective on this model was a basic translation of these elements into the main roles of commercial drywall endeavors. In Part 1, I outlined some basic job descriptions of estimators, project managers and superintendents.
As with any organizational venture, this three-part model developed over the years as a matter of growing demands in the construction field. One can project instinctively that the roles of estimators and superintendents diverged almost immediately due to the very distinct nature of their functions: one in a decidedly calculating capacity, with the other in a purely supervisory role. Eventually, the role of project manager emerged as the tasks generally handled by estimators became more demanding and more sophisticated. Thus, the iron triangle was formed.
As the distinctive functions of the triangle emerged, the theme of division between the factions grew more apparent, while the triplex positions intensified. Estimators vigorously reinforced their various endeavors related to bidding work (sales), while project managers evolved in their tasks of tracking jobs (oversight), and superintendents grew stronger in the execution of the work (supervision). And while the divisions of these endeavors generated an effective construction management model overall, certain competing interests inevitably crept into the mix, creating grave dissension within the paradigm and some serious erosion of its efficacy.
Consider, for instance, the nearly authoritarian influence that a superintendent might wield over a more vulnerable project manager (PM). A superintendent’s role as a personnel manager might easily translate into an ominous disadvantage for a PM, who may merely watch with dismay as their counterpart enacts policies and programs that eat into a PM’s exposed budget.
Aggressive wage levels, personnel preferences (foremen’s positions) and premium time discretion are just a few of these supervisory plans that might erode a project manager’s financial position. Consider too that while the PM has little or no recourse in these issues, the PM is ultimately responsible for the monetary course of the project. I once observed a project manager’s budget reflect a 10% profit margin reduced to 10% deficiency over the two-year duration of a critical project.
Another chink in the armor of the paradigm’s veracity involves a PM’s preferential ability to set a budget that trumps the original foundation of the estimate. Suppose, for example, a PM discovers an error in the estimate but refuses to enact a budget adjustment that would help negate the error.
A similar flaw in this construction management model relates to an estimator’s vulnerability to the criticism of the estimate. A bidmeister makes many discretionary judgment calls—production levels, cost contingencies and material pricing, just to name a few—to arrive at the ultimate valuation of a project. These possibilities must ultimately be determined at the time in which a project is bid. An estimator’s discretion is effectively frozen at that deadline. Yet the temptation for a PM or a superintendent to criticize upon review seems to be inescapable. In other words, Monday morning quarterbacking can be rampant for a vulnerable bidmeister.
This critique is not to disparage the nature of this three-way organizational paradigm. Clearly, the advantages of the iron triangle model of construction management can be a boon to commercial drywall managers who require good structure. But the various weaknesses in the model must be met with a critical eye, as well.
